This paper considers the relationship between two general neutral business tax structures, which we label the '…rm tax' and the 'shareholder tax'. The well-known R-based and S-based cash ‡ow taxes, analysed by Meade (1978) , are special cases of these two taxes. We demonstrate the neutrality of both taxes in the presence of uncertainty, and characterise the tax rules required in the event of default and wind-up. Our analysis provides the …rst proof of the neutrality of the S-based cash ‡ow tax and the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) corporation tax under uncertainty. We also discuss implementation and tax avoidance issues.
Introduction
In this paper we explore the design of neutral business taxes under uncertainty.
We discuss two general tax structures which are neutral in the presence of symmetric information between providers of debt …nance and the owners of the …rm.
We highlight the di¤erent information requirements and revenue raising potential of each tax and of some special cases.
We de…ne a tax on an investment project to be neutral if the post-tax net present value (NP V ) has the same sign as the pre-tax net present value (NP V ¤ ).
This implies that a marginal investment (N P V ¤ = 0) should pay no tax in present value terms. In de…ning neutrality in this way, we abstract from general equilibrium e¤ects of the introduction of the tax on both the interest rate and the pricing of risk; this could be justi…ed in a number of ways, including an assumption of lump-sum compensation in a one-agent model, or an appeal to a small open economy that is a price-taker in world capital markets.
In a perfectly competitive capital market the two general taxes both make N P V proportional to N P V ¤ . However, one can be thought of as a tax on the net present value generated by the …rm (the …rm tax), and the other a tax on the net present value captured by shareholders (the shareholder tax). The main distinction is whether interest payments are deductible from the tax base. The …rm tax does not allow interest deductibility, and in an earlier paper (Bond and Devereux, 1995) we demonstrated its neutrality under symmetric information in a perfectly competitive capital market. However, all corporate income taxes in OECD countries permit interest payments to be deductible from the tax base.
Here we demonstrate the neutrality of an alternative tax structure which allows interest deductibility. So far as we are aware, this provides the …rst proof that the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) corporation tax, proposed by IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991) , is neutral in the presence of uncertainty. However 1 we also show that administering a neutral tax with interest deductibility (the shareholder tax) imposes greater information requirements on the government and may be expected to raise less revenue at the same tax rates. The tax rules in the event of default are crucial to the neutrality of each tax -yet very few papers in this literature have considered the possibility of default. 1 Two well-known cash ‡ow taxes -analysed in the case of certainty by Meade (1978) and others -are special cases of the two general tax structures that we consider here. The R-based tax is a special case of the …rm tax under which the depreciation allowance is 100% in the …rst period. The S-based tax (or equivalently the R+F-based tax) is a special case of the shareholder tax, where the depreciation allowance in the …rst period is equal to the proportion of the project …nanced by equity. 2 Again to the best of our knowledge, we provide the …rst proof that the S-based cash ‡ow tax is neutral under uncertainty.
In the central case examined, we assume that outside providers of debt …nance receive a normal return on their investment in a perfectly competitive credit market. In this case, the N P V of the …rm is wholly captured by shareholders, and is therefore equal to the N P V of the shareholders. In this case, there is no distinction between the two taxes in present value terms; both levy a tax with a net present value of ¿ NP V ¤ , where ¿ is the tax rate. However, in the case of the shareholder tax, the government requires more information in order to implement the tax rules that are required for neutrality in the event of default. Any di¤erence in the tax rate applied to rents that accrue to shareholders and rents that accrue to creditors also creates the potential for tax avoidance. Further, if (untaxed) lenders are able to capture part of the economic rent (either as a result of credit market imperfections or collusion), then at the same tax rate, the shareholder tax will raise less revenue than the …rm tax in present value terms. We conclude that it would be simpler to implement a neutral tax on …rm pro…ts before interest, without the additional complications that are introduced by interest deductibility.
Perfect competition in the credit market
In this section we assume perfect competition in the provision of debt …nance. Below, we analyse conditions under which a business tax which incorporates interest deductibility can be neutral under uncertainty. However, in order to provide an intuitive understanding of this form of taxation, and also for later reference, we begin by summarising the tax rules under which the …rm tax is neutral. We make the de…nitions consistent with proofs and examples which follow in the paper by considering a …rm which consists of only one investment project, which has an initial capital cost normalised to be unity in period 0. The de…nitions are easily extended to more general cases, and such cases are discussed below where they have a bearing on the analysis.
Firm tax
De…nition 1. We de…ne the …rm tax to have the following form:
(i) Revenues net of operating costs, R t , in each period t, are taxed at the known constant rate ¿ , 0 · ¿ < 1, whether the tax base is positive or negative.
(ii) There is an arbitrary schedule of 'depreciation' allowances, z t , in each period t, with a limit such that 1 P t=0 z t · 1, since the initial capital cost is unity.
(iii) A 'cost of …nance' allowance is given in each period of r t Z t¡1 , whether or not the …rm defaults or winds up, where r t is the spot risk-free nominal rate of interest between t-1 and t, and
, so that Z t¡1 is the 'tax written down value' of the assets at the end of period t-1.
(iv) If the …rm winds up in period t, there is a balancing charge on wind-up of ¿ (K t ¡ Z t ), where K t is the market value of the assets sold in period t.
Thus the tax charge is ¿ [R t ¡ z t ¡ r t Z t¡1 ] for continuing operations, and
in the event of wind-up. These tax charges are independent of whether or not the …rm defaults on debt obligations and ownership of the …rm is transferred to creditors. De…nition 2. A special case of the …rm tax is the R-based cash ‡ow tax, where z 0 = 1, and z t = 0 for t¸1, and consequently Z t = 0 in all periods. This gives tax charges of ¿ R t for continuing operations, and ¿ (R t + K t ) in the event of wind-up.
Using these de…nitions, we can now state: Proposition 1. The …rm tax is neutral in the presence of symmetric information and perfect competition in the credit market.
Proof. See Bond and Devereux (1995).
An intuition for this neutrality result can be most easily understood by …rst considering the case of the R base. We assume that shareholders aim to maximise the N P V of all net cash ‡ows associated with the project that they pay and receive, which is equivalent to the NP V of the economic rent earned by the project for the shareholders. If we further assume a perfectly competitive market for the provision of debt …nance, then debtholders will not receive any part of the project's economic rent. The NP V to the shareholders is therefore equal to the N P V of all real cash ‡ows associated with the project. 3 The R base taxes all real cash ‡ows associated with the project, positive and negative, at the tax rate ¿ , thereby reducing the NP V by the same proportion (note again that we assume that the risk-free rate of interest and the pricing of risk are una¤ected by the presence of the tax). Marginal projects, with pre-tax N P V ¤ = 0, are therefore untaxed; more generally, the sign of the pre-tax NP V ¤ is the same as the sign of the post-tax NP V , as long as 0 · ¿ < 1.
The more general …rm tax may allow only part of the initial cost of the asset to be deducted from the tax base in the …rst period (z 0 < 1 ) Z 0 > 0). The remaining features of the tax are designed to compensate exactly for this lower initial allowance. Any part of the initial cost not yet deducted from the tax base is carried forward to the following period and marked up by the risk-free rate of interest, r t . The allowance of r t Z t¡1 in any period compensates the shareholders for not having received the deduction of Z t¡1 in the previous period. Eventually, if the …rm winds up with Z t > 0, compensation for any outstanding amount Z t is given by a reduction in the balancing charge relative to the R base (i.e. the tax charge on wind-up is ¿ (K t ¡ Z t ) instead of ¿ K t ). The reason the risk-free interest rate is appropriate here is that the tax is designed in such a way that these deductions are certain to be received by the …rm at some point in time, with guaranteed full compensation for any delay in receiving them. 4 This result illustrates an error with a common interpretation of the 'ideal pro…ts tax', analysed under certainty by several authors (see, for example, Stiglitz (1973), King (1975) , Nickell (1978) and Sandmo (1979) ). Under certainty, the 'ideal pro…ts tax' is a special case of the …rm tax in which depreciation allowances are set equal to true economic depreciation in each period, so that Z t = K t for all t, and the deduction of r t K t¡1 evaluated at the risk-free interest rate ensures neutrality. Under uncertainty, Boadway and Bruce (1984) is not neutral if r ¤ t 6 = r t , unless there is a complex o¤setting balancing charge on wind-up.
It follows that, in the special case of the 'ideal pro…ts tax' where Z t = K t , a deduction in period t of r ¤ t K t¡1 rather than r t K t¡1 is too generous if r ¤ t > r t .
Consequently, there must be an additional charge on wind-up, which in present value terms o¤sets the bene…ts of the more generous deductions r
More generally, suppose that there is some risk that the full value of the deductions r t Z t¡1 may not be claimed -for example if the government refuses to pay a rebate in the event of default or wind-up. To obtain neutrality in this case, the government would need to give tax relief at the interest rate required to compensate for the risk that the full value of these deductions may not be claimed.
This is clearly not the same as the required rate of return on the risky project.
Since the government will generally not know the appropriate rate at which to give this tax relief, the only feasible way of achieving neutrality is to guarantee full payment of the deductions r t Z t¡1 , as in the …rm tax de…ned above. 5 
Shareholder tax
Given that, in contrast to the …rm tax described above, all corporate income taxes in OECD countries permit actual interest payments to be deductible from the tax base, it is natural to ask whether interest deductibility can be consistent with neutrality. We now de…ne a set of tax rules which include interest deductibility and which are neutral under the same conditions as the …rm tax.
De…nition 3. We de…ne the shareholder tax to have the following form:
(iii) A 'cost of equity …nance' allowance is given in each period of r t (Z t¡1 ¡ t¡1 ), whether or not the …rm defaults or winds up, where r t is the spot risk-free nominal rate of interest between t-1 and t,
, so that Z t¡1 is the 'tax written down value' of the assets at the end of period t-1, and¸t ¡1 is the outstanding amount of debt at the end of period t-1. This is the 'allowance for corporate equity' of the ACE corporate tax proposal.
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(iv) An allowance is given in each period in which the …rm does not default of i t¸t¡1 , where i t is the nominal rate of interest charged on outstanding debt between t-1 and t, so that i t¸t¡1 is the nominal interest payment.
(v) If the …rm winds up in period t, but does not default, there is a balancing charge of ¿ (K t ¡ Z t ) where K t is the market value of the assets in period t.
(vi) If the …rm defaults in period t, the existing shareholders receive a tax allowance of (Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ), in addition to the allowance described in (iii), whether or not the …rm is wound up.
(vii) If the …rm defaults in period t and is wound up, the creditors have no tax liability.
(viii) If the …rm defaults in period t and the creditors choose not to wind up, the 'tax written down value' of assets carried forward to period t+1 is set equal to the net present value in period t of the subsequent pre-tax cash ‡ows of the project.
6 See IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991).
Thus the tax charge is
wind-up without default. If the …rm defaults on debt obligations there is a tax rebate of ¿ (1 + r t )(Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ) paid to the existing shareholders, and there are implications for later tax payments if the …rm is not wound up.
De…nition 4.
A special case of the shareholder tax is the S-based cash ‡ow tax, where z 0 = 1 ¡¸0, and z t =¸t ¡1 ¡¸t, and consequently Z t =¸t in all periods.
This gives tax charges of ¿ [R t +¸t ¡ (1 + i t )¸t ¡1 ] for continuing operations, and
in the event of wind-up without default. In this case the tax rebate is zero if the …rm defaults. 7
Proposition 2. The shareholder tax is neutral in the presence of symmetric information and perfect competition in the credit market.
Proof. See the Appendix.
An intuition for the neutrality of the shareholder tax can be found by …rst considering the S base. Under symmetric information and perfect competition in the credit market, as already argued, shareholders capture the whole of the economic rent of the project. The NP V of the project is therefore equal to the net present value of all cash ‡ows to and from the shareholders, including those associated with …nancing the purchase of capital inputs. The S base taxes all these ‡ows at rate ¿ as they arise, thereby reducing N P V by the same proportion.
Cash ‡ows received by debtholders are not taxed, even if they arise in the event of default.
For the S-based cash ‡ow tax, the neutral tax rules in the event of default are quite simple. Shareholders receive full tax relief up front for investing equity in the project, so there is no delayed tax relief paid to shareholders under provision (vi) above (i.e. Z t¡1 =¸t ¡1 ). If the …rm is wound up when it defaults, the creditors pay no tax. If the creditors choose not to wind-up the …rm, provision (viii) ensures that the expected tax charge on the continuing operation of the project also has zero net present value, and these tax rules do not distort the creditors' decision whether to wind up the project or not. 8 The intuition as to why the general shareholder tax is also neutral is then very similar to that for the general …rm tax. Under the S base, the …rm receives a deduction equal to the value of the new equity injected by the shareholders -for example, z 0 = 1 ¡¸0 for a project costing one unit, implying that Z 0 =¸0. With this tax relief, the government in e¤ect contributes ¿ (1 ¡¸0) to the investment, and shareholders contribute (1 ¡ ¿ )(1 ¡¸0). Under the general shareholder tax, z 0 may not equal 1 ¡¸0. Just as for the …rm tax, the full value of the shortfall (excess) in this initial tax relief relative to the S base is given (clawed back) -with certainty -at some later date. This is partly achieved by giving tax relief to existing shareholders in all circumstances of ¿ r t (Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ) to compensate for not having received the full S base relief in period t ¡ 1. In addition if the …rm winds up in period t, then compared to the S base, shareholders receive an additional payment of ¿ (Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ) if the …rm defaults, and a reduction in the balancing charge worth ¿ (Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ) if the …rm does not default.
In the event of default, shareholders are paid ¿ (1 + r t )(Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ). It is important that this is not paid to creditors; if instead a payment was made to creditors, it would need to be ¿ (1 + r t )(Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 )=(1 ¡ ¿ ). The reason for this di¤erence is that giving the tax relief to creditors can only have an impact on the wealth of the shareholders through the interest rate they are charged. But under the shareholder tax, any reduction in the interest rate, say ¢i t , reduces the cost to shareholders of paying interest by only ¢i t (1 ¡ ¿ ). Consequently, if the payment were made to creditors it would need to grossed up by a factor of 1=(1 ¡ ¿ ). Note, however, that both creditors and shareholders are equally well o¤ under either of these two possibilities. Under perfect competition in the debt market creditors always break even. Shareholders are indi¤erent between receiving a rebate in the event of default and a lower interest rate in the absence of default. Similarly, the net present value of tax payments is also una¤ected. 
Comparison of …rm tax and shareholder tax
There are several important di¤erences between the …rm tax and the shareholder tax.
First, if there is some possibility of default, the interest rate charged by lenders, i t , will exceed the risk-free rate, r t . Relative to the …rm tax with identical values of depreciation allowances, by allowing actual interest deductibility for the part of the project …nanced by debt, the shareholder tax therefore gives a more generous deduction than the …rm tax when the …rm does not default. The equivalence of the two taxes in present value terms is achieved by making the shareholder tax less generous (ex ante) than the …rm tax if the …rm does default.
Beyond this, however, the two forms of tax may di¤er when the assumptions of perfect competition and symmetric information are relaxed. We consider three cases: …rst, imperfect competition in the provision of credit, which permits the debtholder to capture part of the rent accruing from the project; second, where the government does not have full information -speci…cally the case in which it cannot observe the value of a …rm which has defaulted but has not been wound up;
and third, where the shareholders and debtholders act as a coalition to maximise their joint post-tax pro…t.
Imperfect competition in the credit market
The neutrality of the …rm tax is demonstrated in Bond and Devereux (1995) , and the neutrality of the shareholder tax is demonstrated in the Appendix, both on the assumption of perfect competition in the provision of credit to the …rm. An important implication of this assumption is that the creditors earn only a normal rate of return and consequently the shareholders capture the entire economic rent.
However, more generally, it may be the case that lenders can share in the economic rent of the project. In this case, NP V S < NP V F , where NP V S is the economic rent accruing to the shareholders and NP V F is the total economic rent earned by the …rm. For example, suppose that the …rm already has an incumbent bank which provides all of its debt …nance. An alternative lender would need to pay a …xed cost, C, to enter the market in supplying debt …nance to the …rm -covering the cost of acquiring information about the …rm, for example. In this case, the (untaxed) incumbent bank can charge an interest rate which allows it to capture part or all of the NP V F , up to a limit of C. Beyond this limit, new entrants would be prepared to o¤er a lower rate. De…ning the part of NP V F captured in interest payments as G, this implies that NP V S = max(NP V F ¡G; 0)
and also that G = min(NP V F ; C). It follows that:
Proposition 3. As long as the …rm and bank do not act as a coalition, then both the …rm tax and the shareholder tax remain neutral if the interest rate charged on borrowing exceeds the perfectly competitive rate. However, for a given tax rate, the shareholder tax raises less revenue.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that under symmetric information the present value of tax paid under the …rm tax is ¿ NP V F and that from the share-11 holder tax is ¿ NP V S . 10 Assume that shareholders maximise NP V S and the bank maximises G. Under the …rm tax,
F is the present value of the real net cash ‡ows in the absence of tax. In this case, the tax revenue raised is independent of the interest rate and the tax is neutral: the sign of neither N P V F nor N P V S can change as a result of the tax. Under the
In this case, any economic rent paid out as interest escapes tax altogether and tax revenue may be lower than under the …rm tax, since for a given tax rate
In an extreme case, with no collusion between shareholders and lenders, tax revenue may fall to zero.
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The shareholder tax remains neutral, however, since again the sign of neither N P V F nor N P V S can change as a result of the tax.
The intuition for this proposition is clear. Interest paid escapes being taxed under the shareholder tax. If part of the economic rent is paid out as interest, the present value of tax revenues must therefore be lower. We have assumed here that rents accruing to lenders escape tax altogether; however the proposition remains true so long as rents that accrue to lenders are taxed at a lower rate than rents that accrue to shareholders in the …rm.
Information requirements
The information requirements of the shareholder tax exceed those of the …rm tax. The R-based cash ‡ow tax uses observable cash ‡ows as the tax base and so imposes minimum information requirements. The general …rm tax requires the government also to have information on the risk-free rate of interest, r t . In 10 The second case is demonstrated in the Appendix. See equation (5.18). 11 Tax revenue may fall below zero if the interest payment exceeds the payment in the perfectly competitive case by more than the economic rent; then N P VS < 0, and the shareholders e¤ec-tively receive a rebate under the shareholder tax. However, this would require a side payment from creditors to shareholders to prevent the latter facing a negative net present value. This is discussed further below. addition to this, however, the general shareholder tax requires the government to make an appropriate valuation of the …rm in the event that the …rm defaults on its debt but is not wound up.
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As de…ned in part (viii) of De…nition 3, this must equal the pre-tax market value of the …rm. 13 This may be observed if the …rm is sold by its creditors in the open market. However, in general it may not be observed; further, the creditors (i.e. the new owners) have an incentive to exaggerate this value in order to gain higher tax allowances in subsequent periods.
To the extent that the creditors can exaggerate this value, subsequent tax revenue will be lower, and the creditors will have an extra incentive to continue the …rm, rather than to wind it up; that is, the tax would both raise less revenue and be non-neutral with respect to wind up decisions.
This problem could be limited by introducing an upper bound on the market value of the …rm used in these circumstances, based on the criteria for default. But the condition for default implies that, in the absence of better information available to the government, an upper bound of (1 + i 1 )¸0 ¡ R 1 could be put on V 1 2 , which limits -but does not eliminate -the scope for exaggeration. 
Susceptibility to coalitions
A coalition of shareholders and creditors could agree to set an interest rate higher than its competitive market level, with a side payment from creditors to shareholders to compensate for the higher charge. This is similar to the case of imperfect competition in the credit market in that -for tax purposes at least -the creditors may receive part of the economic rent. This has no impact on the tax charge under a …rm tax. However, in the absence of default and wind-up, the tax liability of the …rm under the shareholder tax is ¿ fR t ¡ z t ¡ r t (Z t¡1 ¡¸t ¡1 ) ¡ i t¸t¡1 g.
Clearly, other things being equal, a higher interest charge i t¸t¡1 implies a lower shareholder tax charge. It is for this reason that most business taxes -which allow interest deductibility -are burdened with complex provisions designed to prevent this form of avoidance. Further, given that the shareholder tax is symmetric, a negative tax liability implies a tax rebate. Thus when we consider collusion between shareholders and debtholders -unlike the case of imperfect competition in the credit market -there is no lower limit to the tax charge. Increasing the interest rate simply increases the size of the tax rebate. In turn, this implies that the tax would not be neutral; a potential negative tax liability may induce the coalition of shareholders and creditors to undertake an investment project which would not have been undertaken in the absence of tax.
A related possibility is for the coalition of shareholders and creditors to set an interest rate high enough to induce default. In this case the creditor receives an amount greater than the taxable pro…t before interest in that period; under the shareholder tax, the di¤erence between the two represents a taxable loss to the shareholders, who are compensated since it is a symmetric tax. The creditors have the further opportunity to continue to operate the …rm, and to exaggerate the market value of the …rm they acquire to minimise their future tax liabilities;
indeed, setting this value high enough is likely to yield a subsequent taxable loss, 14 with further tax rebates being paid to the creditors (i.e. the new owners). 15 In this context, the upper bound on the market value of the defaulting …rm discussed in the previous section is likely to be ine¤ective, since it depends in turn on the rate of interest, i t :
Conclusions
In this paper we have done three things. First, we have shown how the neutral business taxes discussed in the literature can be classed into two general structures: the …rm tax and the shareholder tax. Second, we have developed tax rules such that these taxes are neutral even in the presence of uncertainty and the possibility of default. As a result, we have proved the neutrality of both the S-based cash ‡ow tax and the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) tax in the presence of uncertainty. Third, we have discussed di¤erences between the two tax structures with regard to the information required by the government to implement each tax, the tax revenues which could be collected under each tax, and their vulnerability to collusion between shareholders and debtholders.
The well-known cash ‡ow taxes are special cases of the taxes described here.
The R-based tax is a special case of the …rm tax, and the S-based tax (and the equivalent R+F base) is a special case of the shareholder tax. However, the 'ideal pro…ts tax' as commonly interpreted is shown not to be neutral when there is uncertainty.
In the event of default, there are no special rules required under the …rm tax.
In contrast, when the …rm defaults under the shareholder tax, the shareholders must receive a rebate, while the debtholders must pay no tax and, if they choose to continue to operate the …rm, the present value of expected future tax payments must also be zero. This can be implemented on a period-by-period basis by attributing an appropriate measure of the market value of the defaulting …rm to be the 'equity' input of the new owners. However this value is not generally observable, so that the information required to implement the neutral shareholder tax exceeds that needed to implement the neutral …rm tax in a potentially signi…cant way. Since the shareholder tax allows interest deductibility, it also raises less revenue than the …rm tax (at the same tax rate) if part of the economic rent of a project is captured by (untaxed) lenders. Finally, the shareholder tax is open to abuse from a coalition of shareholders and debtholders, and would require complex anti-avoidance rules to prevent this. We conclude that the …rm tax structure, without interest deductibility, o¤ers the simpler and more robust route to implementing a neutral business tax. The net present value of the project to the shareholders in the absence of tax is: we make no speci…c assumptions about asset pricing, other than it satis…es value additivity.
16 This is satis…ed in many well-known asset pricing models, including the Arrow-Debreu complete markets model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory.
With symmetric information and perfect competition in the market for the provision of debt …nance, the market value of the distribution of possible returns from lending to the …rm must equal the value of the loan. Hence there is a noarbitrage condition which determines the interest rate (i 1 ) charged on the initial debt:¸0
If the …rm does not default, the lenders are repaid with interest. If the …rm defaults, the creditors may wind up or continue the …rm, in the same way as the original shareholders. This implies that the creditors receive the return in period 1, and then choose whether to continue the …rm ( e w = 0) or to wind it up ( e w = 1).
In the former case, the creditors could alternatively sell the …rm for the current 16 Value additivity requires that for two stochastic payo¤s, e X and e Y , and for two non-stochastic constants ® and¯, we have Vi
market value of the future net income stream. With symmetric information, this is equal to the value derived by the creditors if the …rm is not sold. For simplicity, we assume that the level of borrowing in period 1 ( ȩ 1 ) does not depend on the identity of the (then) owners, although this is not crucial to the analysis.
Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition for debt issued in period 1 is:
where V 1 2 [:] denotes the present value in period 1 of a possibly uncertain cash ‡ow arising in period 2.
We …rst use equation (5.3) to simplify (5.2). In period 1, it is known whether the …rm has defaulted on its initial debt, and whether the …rm has been wound up, so both sides of (5.3) can be multiplied by the known realisation of b 1 (1 ¡ w).
Taking the present value in period 0 of both sides of the resulting expression gives
for some possibly uncertain cash ‡ow e X 2 arising in period 2. Using (5.4) in (5.2) then giveş
oi :
We now use (5.3) to simplify (5.1) in the same way. From (5.3) we obtain
which used in (5.1) gives
Then using (5.5) in (5.7) gives
If the distribution of the net cash ‡ows and wind-up values of the assets is independent of the level of default risk, equation (5.8) shows that N P V ¤ is independent of gearing, which is just a manifestation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. However, we do not impose this; there may be an optimal level of default risk (and hence gearing) which maximises NP V ¤ .
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In either case, the shareholders capture the whole of the economic rent generated by the project; lenders in a perfectly competitive credit market with symmetric information earn no rent.
Analysis of tax payments
We now de…ne the tax payments in each period under the shareholder tax (see De…nition 3). In period 0, the …rm receives a 'depreciation' allowance at an arbitrary rate z 0 , so that the tax payment is:
In period 1, if the …rm does not default ( e b 1 = 0), the tax base consists of (i) the net cash ‡ow e R 1 , (ii) less a further 'depreciation' allowance of e z 1 , (iii) less an allowance equal to the risk-free rate of interest applied to the 'tax written down value' of the asset at the end of the previous period (1 ¡ z 0 ) minus the outstanding amount of debt at the end of the previous period¸0, i.e. an 'allowance for corporate equity' of r 1 (1 ¡ z 0 ¡¸0) , (iv) less an interest deduction of i 1¸0 , (v) plus a balancing charge in the event of wind-up on the di¤erence between the sale proceeds e K 1 and the 'tax written down value' (1 ¡ z 0 ¡ e z 1 ). If the …rm defaults ( e b 1 = 1), the creditors pay no tax and the original shareholders receive a rebate to re ‡ect the loss that they have made on their 'equity input' (for tax purposes) of (1 ¡ z 0 ¡¸0) marked up at the risk-free rate of interest, r 1 . The total tax charge in period 1 is therefore:
The tax charge in period 2 follows exactly the same principles as in period 1. The only complication is that the value of the 'allowance for corporate equity' depends on whether the …rm defaulted in period 1. If it did not, so that the original shareholders maintain their ownership, the 'equity input' attributed to the shareholders is again the 'tax written down value' of the asset at the end of period 1, (1 ¡z 0 ¡ e z 1 ), minus the outstanding amount of debt at the end of period 1, ȩ 1 . The tax charge in this case is exactly analogous to that for period 1:
However, if the …rm defaulted in period 1 without being wound up, the 'equity input' attributed to the new shareholders (i.e. the original debtholders) is the market value in period 1 of the distribution of pre-tax returns that the …rm will earn in period 2, V 
If the …rm defaults in period 2, the creditors have no tax liability.
Consider …rst the expression for e T D 2 . Taking the present value in period 1 of this tax payment, and rearranging, gives
Given these tax rules, condition (5.3) still holds. Using (5.3) in (5.13) gives
for a stochastic payo¤ e X 2 in period 2.
This is consistent with the principle that, in present value terms, debtholders pay no tax. In this case, if the …rm defaults in period 1 and is subsequently run by the period 1 creditors, the present value in period 1 of any tax payable in period 2 is zero. This is a direct result of de…ning the 'equity input' in this case
. This highlights the importance of determining this value in period 1. Since, in present value terms, no tax is paid by debtholders, the no-arbitrage condition (5.2) also continues to hold in the presence of tax.
We now consider the present value in period 0 of the shareholders' possible tax liabilities on this project, de…ned as N P V
Using the de…nitions in (5.9), (5.10) and (5.11) we have
We start by collecting and simplifying all terms involving the 'depreciation' allowances, which are
for a period 1 payo¤ e Y 1 whose value is known in period 1 but not in period 0.
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Using this simpli…cation in (5.15) gives
We next simplify the remaining debt terms in the same way, to obtain
Now compare this expression for N P V that the same no-arbitrage conditions hold in the credit market in the presence of this tax, we can immediately follow the steps from (5.1) to (5.8) to obtain
Tax neutrality
Combining the results of the previous two sections, we can express the net present value of the project to the shareholders in the presence of this tax as:
If the wind-up decision is una¤ected by the presence of the tax, and the distribution of f e R 1 ; e R 2 ; e K 1 ; e K 2 g is independent of default risk, then expression (5.19) implies that N P V = (1 ¡ ¿ )NP V ¤ and hence the tax is neutral with respect to the investment decision.
More generally, however, if the distribution of f e R 1 ; e R 2 ; e K 1 ; e K 2 g depends on the distribution of default outcomes, we must consider the possibility of an optimal choice of gearing. In this case, in the absence of tax, gearing is chosen to maximise In the presence of tax, the shareholders would pay tax if they did not default and would receive a rebate if they did default. Taking both of these into account, this condition for default becomes The extension of this proof to the case in which the …rm may not be wound up in period 1 is straightforward.
To complete the proof of the neutrality of this tax system, we now show that the wind-up decision is una¤ected by the presence of this tax. With no tax, the …rm is wound up in period 1 if 20 Note that in the alternative case discussed in Section 2, in which a rebate is paid to the creditors rather than shareholders, both the default conditions and the debt arbitrage conditions would change. Following the same approach in this case, it can be shown that, if there is an optimal level of gearing, the level of period 0 debt chosen in the presence of tax is given by This condition simpli…es to
Then using (5.3) we obtain the condition
which coincides with condition (5.24) in the absence of tax.
This con…rms that the wind-up decision is una¤ected by this tax, and completes the proof that the shareholder tax we have considered here is neutral with respect to value-maximising investment, gearing and wind-up decisions.
